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The Competitiveness of Farm Credit Markets in a Deregulated Environment 
 
Major structural changes occurring over the past 30 years have greatly altered the 
appearance of the US banking industry. Until the 1980’s, banking in the US was a 
decentralized collection of segmented local markets.  Interstate banking legislation 
enacted in the 1980’s relaxed entry barriers and consolidated the industry through 
mergers.  These changes were especially evident in rural America.  Like the public square 
or the courthouse, locally owned and operated community banks were once a mainstay of 
small towns. While locally owned and operated community banks are still present in the 
small towns of rural America, their presence has given way to large regional and money 
center banks.  Banking deregulation has enabled greater branching and more 
consolidation of banking institutions.  In 1975, there were nearly 19,000 banks and 
savings and loans with 59,000 nationwide offices.  By 2004, the number of institutions 
had declined to under 10,000, but the number of branch offices exceeded 80,000.  The 
brick and mortar of large bank buildings with a huge lobby and rows of tellers have given 
way to ATM’s and small retail offices located in supermarkets and Walmarts. 
 
The impact of the changing banking industry on agricultural credit can have significant 
implications for Federal farm credit programs.  One of the primary economic 
justifications for Federal farm credit programs is that a shortage of lenders providing 
farm loans may result farmers facing uncompetitive credit markets (Executive Office of 
the President).  One intended outcome of Federal credit programs is to lessen 
disadvantages faced by those facing uncompetitive markets.  The proliferation of retail 
bank offices occurring since deregulation suggests an improved access to credit, and 
consequently, more competitive credit markets.  But, does greater general availability of 
credit affect farm credit markets?  If the expansion in banking services is mostly 
occurring in urban areas, some agricultural producers may still be facing uncompetitive 
loan markets, and Federal credit programs may still be justified. 
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The extent to which farmers may face uncompetitive credit markets is examined in this 
paper. Local credit markets were categorized according to their apparent competitiveness 
concerning farm loans. The structural characteristics of farms among markets considered 
most competitive were contrasted with characteristics of farms in counties considered 
less competitive. The possible interaction between competitiveness of local credit 
markets and farm interest rates is examined.  It was expected that once those farmers in 
less competitive credit markets would be more likely to have less favorable loan terms, 
specifically higher interest rates for a given level of risk. Standard regression techniques 




The impact of banking deregulation and structural changes on the banking industry has 
been much debated.  On the one hand, consolidation is expected to improve the 
performance of the banking sector by eliminating inefficiencies and over capacity while 
the proliferation of banking offices enhances the availability of banking services.  Large 
banking organizations can make farmers and rural communities less vulnerable to 
disruptions in local economic activity. Yet, smaller banks are much more likely than 
large banks to shrink their loan portfolio in response to bank capital and aggregate 
economic conditions (Hancock and Wilcox). On the other hand, deregulation can result in 
banks orienting their business development toward more affluent groups resulting in less 
credit available to those with less means.   
 
 
Concerns about adverse impacts from banking deregulation seem to be greater among 
farmers and others in rural America.  While these concerns may arise from a long-held 
notion that banking consolidation is a threat to rural regions, past studies have indeed 
indicated a relationship between banking consolidation and rural credit availability.  Past 
research has demonstrated that the presence of large banks in rural areas may adversely 
affect the supply of credit to farmers and rural residents (Ellinger and Neff, 
Featherstone).  Plus, studies have demonstrated that small firms, such as family farms,   4
tend to obtain their credit from smaller bank offices located within the community 
(Berger and Udell, 1998).  And, acquisitions of rural banks by out-of-state organizations 
tended to reduce lending to small businesses (Keeton). Gilbert and Belongia (1988) found 
that a bank’s lending to farmers as a percent of total loans declined with bank size 
suggesting that consolidation will tend to restrict the access of farmers to credit. Yet, 
other studies have indicated that despite banking consolidation, small businesses still 
have ample access to credit.  Berger et.al. found that even when large banks reduced 
lending to small businesses, smaller banks operating in the same lending territory 
increased their lending to small businesses.  Featherstone found bank acquisitions and 




For the purposes of this analysis, interest rates were assumed to reflect five factors: (a) a 
return to productive capital; (b) and adjustment reflecting a positive rate of time 
preference; (c) a premium for expected inflation; (d) a risk premium; and (e) non-
competitive pricing premium.  For loans made by a specific lender group of a given size 
and term, the first three factors should be identical across all borrowers.  Differences in 
market rates of interest can vary by lender and the time period over which a loan is made.  
Different groups of lenders do not necessarily compete against each other for the same 
loans.  Government lending agencies such as the Farm Service Agency (FSA) tend not to 
serve the same clientele as commercial banks or the Farm Credit System (FCS) (Dodson 
and Koenig, 2003). Likewise, FCS and commercial banks tend to serve somewhat 
different clienteles (Dodson and Koenig; 2004).  In addition different lenders likely have 
different cost structures and different lending practices which may lead to differences in 
observed rates (Dixon, Ahrendson, and Barry).  
 
Market interest rates are determined by the interaction of lender’s available supply of 
funds to lend and borrower’s demand for loans, both of which are subject to change over 
time. General macroeconomic conditions such as expectations concerning inflation and 
the real rate of interest influences the supply of available loan funds. The demand for   5
loans depends on the current and future economic viability of the borrower’s enterprise, 
which can vary over time.  Thus, interest rates received by a borrower depend on the time 
of loan origination and the term of the loan.   
 
After controlling for loan size and terms, differences in interest rates among borrowers 
should be represented by differences in borrower’s financial risk the competitiveness of 
local credit markets. A reduced form equation is developed which relates the interest 
rates on individual loans of a given term made by a specific lender group during a 






ij u X r + = β  , 
where 
tk
ij r represents the interest rate charged on loan i by lender j, in period t with a term 
of k,  
tk
ij X  represents the factors expected to influence the interest rate, and 
tk
ij u  is an error 
term representing observable and unobservable factors related to interest rates.   
 
Factors expected to influence interest rates, 
tk
ij X , should be related to differences in the  
borrower’s risk profile and market competitiveness.  Goodwin and Mishra found the 
borrower’s risk premium on farm loans to be affected by diversification, wealth, operator 
race, operator age, farming experience, and loan size. Market competitiveness should be 
related to the presence of active lenders within a market area.  
 
Variables included in the empirical model which were expected to measure these factors 
are described in table 1. Most of these variables represent measures of financial risk.  
Typically, loans to refinance existing indebtedness are considered more risky than loans 
to make new investments and would be expected to carry higher rates.  Greater financial 
risk and, hence higher interest rates on loans would be expected among farms with higher 
debt-asset ratios, lower net worth, lower term debt coverage ratios, and lower return on 
assets.   Financial risk and, consequently, interest rates would be expected to be lower 
among farmers with greater management skills.  Operator education and farming 
experience were chosen as proxies of a farmer’s management skill.   It was expected that 
farmers with more years of farming experience and more education would receive lower   6
rates.  Farms with greater diversity of production were expected to have less financial 
risk, and therefore, likely to receive lower rates. Diversification was measured using the 
entropy index which is bounded by 0 and 1. An entropy index of 0 indicates complete 
specialization in one crop while 1 is complete diversification (Jinkins). Farms with 
greater measures of the entropy index should receive lower rates on farm loans. 
 
The level of competition is incorporated in the analysis by using binary variables for the 
most and least competitive groups of counties with respect to farm credit markets. If 
fewer bank branch offices providing farm loans had an adverse impact on competition, 
one would expect bank farm lending rates to farmers would be higher in regions with 
fewer bank branches.  FCS rates are expected to reflect their costs and market conditions.  
Hence, their rates should follow the same general trends evident among banks with 
higher rates expected in less competitive counties and lower rates among more 
competitive counties.  
 
Ryan and Koenig report that FCS’s focuses on serving larger full-time farms as opposed 
to small and part-time farmers.  Such a focus results in lower per-unit cost and, 
consequently, lower rates.  To measure these effects, binary variables for fulltime and 




The analysis utilizes commercial bank Federal Reserve Bank Call Report data and 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Summary of Deposit data to estimate the 
competitiveness of local credit markets. Data on the characteristics of borrowers 
obtaining new farm loans is provided by USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management 
Study (ARMS). The ARMS is a complex sample surveys comprised of data that originate 
with sample designs that adjust for non-responses and differing probabilities of selection.  
Complex samples differ from random surveys in that random surveys assume 
independence of observations, while complex surveys do not. Standard statistical 
techniques assume a random sample and result in under-representation of variances when   7
analyzing data from complex surveys.  Therefore, analysis of data from complex surveys 
should include specific calculation of variance estimates that account for these sample 
characteristics.  For ARMS, a delete-a-group jackknife approach with replication method 
may be used (Dubman). 
 
Table 1. Variable names and descriptions used in empirical model. 
Variable name  Variables Description 
Full-time   1, if primary occupation = farmer, annual operator labor 
hours >1,500, > 50% of household income is from the farm 
business, and annual farm sales > $250,000; 0 otherwise. 
Noncommercial farm  1, if annual farm sales < $100,000; 0 otherwise. 




1, if farm is located in a county considered less competitive 
with respect to agricultural credit; 0 otherwise.   
Competitive credit 
markets 
1, if farm is located in a county considered competitive with 
respect to agricultural credit; 0 otherwise 
Debt-asset ratio  Total year-end debt divided by year-end assets. 
Term debt coverage 
ratio 
Term debt coverage ratio. 
Return on assets  Return on assets (as percent.) 
Operator experience  Number of years of farming experience 
College  1, if farm operator has some college education; 0 otherwise 
Loan size  Dollar amount of loan 
Net worth  Amount of farm net worth in $100,000 
Diversification Diversification index measured using entropy 
 
 
Defining a Market Territory 
 
Galbraith in 1934 outlined the effect that bank branching and bank charters had on the 
supply of agricultural credit in rural areas.  Today, commercial bank charters have no 
geographic lending limitations and thus if banks’ collectively choose not to serve certain 
geographic regions, competition for farm loans may suffer.
1  Because the commercial 
banking system remains the largest supplier of debt capital to agriculture, the presence 
                                                           
1 While interstate banking and branching exists today, in the earlier period of the study interstate 
banking was more restrictive thereby placing geographical barriers on some banks.   8
within a county of banks or branch offices of banks which are active farm lenders should 
be an indicator of local credit market competitiveness.  
 
In the Call Reports to regulators, lending activity of a bank is aggregated and is 
associated with the county of bank’s main office and not the county of its branches. 
Smaller banks that are likely sources of agricultural loans within a county are more easily 
identifiable than larger banks in the Call Report data.  Because large banks’ share of total 
bank lending is sizable and growing, their influence on agricultural credit market 
competitiveness is substantial and can not be ignored due to data limitations.  Past 
research by Levonian has shown that the size and number of bank branches in 
agricultural areas are important to agricultural loan levels of large banks.  Nonetheless, 
branches of larger banks that serve multiple counties or states may or may not represent a 
source of agricultural loans within all counties they serve.  
 
To measure bank lending competition in local farm credit markets given the limitations 
of Call Report data, the number of banking institutions providing agricultural loans 
within each county was estimated using the following criteria.  An agricultural lender was 
considered to be present in the county if either of the following two conditions were met:  
1) the bank’s farm loans were at least 10 percent of its total loans and it had at least 1 
branch office within the county;
2  or 2) the bank had at least $50 million in agricultural 
loans outstanding and maintained at least 1 branch office in a rural area and the branch 
was in a county with a sizable farm population.  A rural area was defined as being located 
20 miles or more outside an urban cluster, as defined by Department of Commerce.  A 
sizable farm population for a county is one having more than 350 indebted farmers, as 
reported by the Census of Agriculture for 2002.  The first condition is intended to capture 
smaller community banks that make agricultural loans.  The second condition is intended 
to capture larger regional banks that make agricultural loans while screening out branches 
in more urban areas that were less likely to make farm loans.   
                                                           
2  This10 percent threshold is more lenient than the definitions of an agricultural bank used by the 
Federal Reserve or FDIC (USDA, 2003).  The Federal Reserve and FDIC measures are intended 
to access an institution’s safety and soundness and not to characterize the competitiveness of 
markets which the institution serves.   9
 
Each county was classified as to its competitiveness for farm lending.   A county was 
considered competitive if 3 or more banks meeting either of the aforementioned 
conditions were present in the county.  About one-third, or 1,017, of all counties were 
considered highly competitive over the 2001- 2002 period.   These highly competitive 
counties were located in the more agricultural regions of the western Corn Belt and Great 
Plains.  Highly competitive markets were also found in Texas, California, Florida, 
Georgia, Pennsylvania, Washington, and the Mississippi Delta. A county was considered 
not to be competitive if no banks meeting aforementioned conditions were present in the 
county.   Using these criteria, 1,035 counties were considered for the 2001–2002 period.  
These counties were located in the more urbanized Northeast, Appalachia, Southeast, and 
Mountain States (figure 1).    
 
Competitiveness of Farm Credit Markets
1999-2002




Sources: FDIC Summary of Deposit Data
Call Report Data  
Figure 1. Farm Credit Competitiveness as Measured Using the Presence of Branch Offices 
of Banks Providing Farm Loans. 
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Borrower Characteristics by Loan Market Competitiveness 
 
There were distinct structural differences among farms located in counties grouped 
according to loan market competitiveness  Summary statistics were estimated using the 
ARMS  for 2001 and 2002 and the 2002 Census of Agriculture.  While counties 
considered  to have little competition with respect to farm credit represented nearly one-
third of all US counties, they comprised only a small share of farms production.  
Agricultural census data indicated that competitive counties represented 47 percent of all 
farms compared to only 19 percent among counties considered to have little credit market 
competition (table 2).  Farms in counties considered to have little competition were 
smaller, averaging $36,964 in annual sales compared to $106,861 in competitive 
counties. Consequently, farms in these less competitive counties represented only 8.6 
percent of all farm sales in 2002 compared to 63.4 percent in competitive counties. 
 
There is also distinct difference in the type of farm by county categorized by competition.  
Larger shares of the farms located in competitive counties were commercial-size field 
crop or fruit and nut farms that were operated by full-time farmers.
3  Large shares of 
farms in regions considered to have little competition were more likely to be either 
smaller part-time or hobby farms specializing in beef cattle, hay, horses, nursery, or 
tobacco.
4   While farms in less competitive regions were smaller and less profitable, off-
farm income tends to be greater resulting in similar levels of average household incomes.  
The ability to service debt, as indicated by the term debt coverage ratio, is greatest in 
counties with less credit market competition.  Also, solvency among farms in non-
competitive counties is higher than more competitive counties.  The greater solvency and 
higher debt coverage ratios suggest that the risk premiums in counties with little credit 
market competition may be lower, perhaps countering any effect on borrower rates 
arising from limited competition. 
                                                           
3 A full-time commercial farmer was defined as someone who considers farming to be their primary 
occupation, is fully employed by the farm business, is reliant on the farm business for most of their family 
income, and has annual farm sales of greater then $250,000.   
4 For purposes of this analysis, part-time farms were defined as those with annual farm sales of less than 
$100,000, the primary operator considered farming to be their occupation, and the primary operator   11
Table 2.  Structural and Financial Characteristics of Farms by Level of 
Credit Market Competition in County. 







Number of farms \1  1,002,711 722,022 404,254 2,129,018 
  Average per farm 
Farm sales \1  106,861 65,508 35,964 79,407 
Total farm assets  574,755 553,942 480,476 550,095 
   Real estate  423,455 431,455 388,685 419,565 
Farm debt  74,999 55,124 36,251 61,056 
Farm Net worth  499,757 498,818 444,224 489,039 
Net cash farm income  20,208 12,379 2,484 14,425 
Net farm income  18,670 11,243 4,697 13,554 
Household income \2  67,699 59,681 63,727 64,258 
 Percent 
  Percent of all US farms \1  47.1 33.9 19.0 100 
  Farms with debt  \1    41.6 33.6 24.5 35.6 
  Percent of US farm sales \1  63.4 28.0 8.6 100 
Selected financial ratios \3   
   Term debt coverage ratio  1.1 1.2 1.9 1.2 
   Return on farm assets  0.3 -0.8 -2.1 -0.4 
   Debt/asset (all farms)   13.0 10.0 7.5 11.1 
   Debt/asset (indebted farms)  23.9 22.1 17.9 22.6 
NAICS Farm type  \4  Percent of all US farms 
  Beef Cattle  29.6  37.9 37.4 33.9 
  Corn/soybean  19.7  7.7 3.8 12.6 
  Wheat  2.8  1.6 0.5 2.0 
  Horses  6.6  8.9 11.2 8.2 
  Dairy  3.7  3.4 2.8 3.4 
  Hay  7.6  10.2 13.3 9.6 
  Poultry  1.4  3.0 2.1 2.1 
  Nursery  2.0  3.1 5.1 3.0 
  Vegetable/peas/potato  1.3  1.8 2.4 1.7 
  Fruits and nuts  4.5  2.6 1.7 3.3 
  Tobacco  0.6  2.4 3.4 1.7 
  Cotton, Rice, Peanuts  1.3  1.0 0.4 1.0 
  All other farm types  18.9  16.4 15.9 17.5 
Total 100  100 100 100 
Full time farms \5  7.0  4.8 1.7 5.3 
Family size farms \6  6.5  4.8 3.1 5.1 
Part-time \7  34.2  35.9 37.6 35.4 
Hobby \8  45.5  49.3 55.3 48.6 
\1 Estimated using 2002 Census of Agriculture\2 Average per farm household. 
\3 Estimated using only farms in ARMS which originated debt \4 North American 
Industrial Classification System (Estimated from 2002 Census of Agriculture). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
supplied less than 1,000 hours of labor annually to the farm business.  Farms defined as hobby included 
those with less than $100,000 in annual farm sales that were not already defined as part-time farmers.     12
Despite differences in the structural characteristics of farms in counties characterized by 
credit market competition, average lending rates on all new debt did not vary 
significantly (table 3). Likewise, commercial bank lending rates displayed no variability 
by level of competition.  Rates on new FCS loans did appear to be higher in counties with 
lower levels of competition.
5  Also, market shares of farm debt held by the FCS and 
commercial banks were similar between the different county groups (table 3).  This 
seems inconsistent with argument that deregulation leads to less farm credit availability.  
But, one must recognize the structural differences in the characteristics of farms between 
these groups of counties. Significant differences in market share among full-time farmers 
by level of credit market competition were found. Specifically, FCS’s market share 
increased while commercial bank’s share decreased with lower levels of competition.  
Meanwhile, debt market shares for part-time and hobby did not appear to be affected by 
level of credit market competition.  
 
Empirical Application 
Analysis of the relationship between the credit market competitiveness and borrower 
interest rates requires controlling for the variability arising from different loan purposes, 
lender preferences, and origination date.  To control for differences in time of origination, 
our analysis considers only new loans made over the 2001-2002 period.  To control for 
differences in loan purpose and lender preferences, new loans are grouped by real estate 
and nonreal estate and lender group. Due to data limitations with the ARMS, only two 
lender groups were considered: commercial banks and FCS. Specifically, we examine 
interest rates on loans made in 2000 and 2001 for 4 groups of lender and loan type: (1) 
commercial bank nonreal estate; (2) commercial bank real estate; (3) FCS nonreal estate; 
and (4) FCS real estate. 
 
Interest rate variability among the aforementioned groups should be attributable to 
financial risk and level of competition.  Regression analysis shows little apparent 
relationship between rates on new loans borrower financial characteristics. Farm net 
                                                           
5 Sample size limitations limited lender groups analyzed to FCS and commercial banks.   13
worth was significant for all FCS loans while term debt coverage ratio was significant 
only for bank real estate loans (table 4).   
 
Table 3. Debt market shares and average interest rates on farms originating debt 
in 2000 and 2001. 









Share of all farm debt held by:  Market share as percent 
    FCS  19 24 20 21 
    Banks  57 52 62 56 
    FSA  34 33  
    Individuals  97 48  
    Merchants & dealers  43 34  
Share of all full-time farm debt held by:    
   FCS  25 37 40 29 
   Banks  54 43 38 50 
Share of all noncommercial size 
 farm debt held by: 
    FCS  14 12 16 13 
    Banks  62 64 70 64 
  Average interest rate as percent 
  
Rate on all new debt by purpose: 
   Nonreal estate  7.1 7.0 6.7 7.0 
   Real estate  6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 
Rate on all new bank debt by 
purpose:   
  Nonreal estate  6.9 7.0 6.8 6.9 
  Real estate   6.4 7.1 6.7 6.7 
Rate on all new FCS debt by 
purpose   
  Nonreal estate   6.0 6.2 7.2 6.3 
  Real estate   5.5 5.9 6.7 6.0 
 
Source: 2001 and 2002 ARMS 
 
 
Many of the variables which were significant had unexpected signs.  Sensitivity analysis 
indicated that rates tended to be inelastic with respect to the debt-to-asset ratio, return on 
assets, net worth, operator diversification, diversification, and coverage ratio (table 5).  
For example, a 1 percent increase in loan size resulted in only a 0.017 percent decline in   14
rates on new bank real estate loans. This would suggest that lender’s do not necessarily 
price loans according to the financial risk of the borrower. However, there may be other 
risk factors considered by lenders that or not captured by the ARMS data. One is the 
presence of Federal or State guarantees, which are present on about 7 percent of all farm 
debt. Neither does ARMS capture the loan-to-value ratio nor the seniority of the lien.  A 
borrower’s credit history as well the presence of co-signers are additional risk factors 
which may affect loan pricing. 
 
Whether or not borrowers were considered full-time or noncommercial farmers appeared 
to influence new loan rates.  Status as a noncommercial farmers increased predicted rates 
on new bank real estate loans by 3.8 percent while status as a full time farmer decreased 
predicted rates on FCS real estate loans by nearly 20 percent (table 5).  Borrowers with 
greater education tended to receive lower real estate and nonreal estate rates for both FCS 
and banks, though it was only significant for bank nonreal estate debt. This seems to 
suggest that lenders perceive those borrowers with higher education to have better 
management skills and, therefore, are less risky. 
 
Location in counties considered to have little competitive with respect to farm credit 
appeared to have no impact on rates charge by banks on new loans.  A significant 
relationship between bank nonreal estate rates and location in a competitive county was 
found, but the magnitude was trivial.  Location in a competitive county was expected to 
reduce bank nonreal estate rates by 1.6 percent which on a 6 percent loan is less than 1-
basis point. 
 
Location in less competitive counties had a significant impact on borrowing rates charged 
by FCS institutions for both real estate and nonreal estate loans.  Predicted rates for 
borrowers in less competitive counties were 32 percent higher on FCS real estate loans. 
On a 6 percent loan, this would represent nearly 2 percentage points higher. Likewise, 
predicted rates on FCS nonreal estate loans were greater in less competitive counties.  
Though, the differential was only 6 percent or about 50-basis points at current rates. 
   15
Table 4.  Parameter Estimates from Jackknife Regression of Farm Interest Rates on 





















Intercept 0.06975  **  0.07855 ** 0.05284 *** 0.06175  ***
  (0.0044)   (0.0011)   (0.0063)   (0.0018)  
Loan 
Size/$100,000 -0.00149  *  0.00700 0.00011  0.00033 
 (0.0010)    (0.0000)   (0.0009)   (0.0005)   
Noncompetitive 
county  -0.00571  0.00036 0.01610  * 0.00943 **
 (0.0065)    (0.0182)   (0.0167)   (0.0042)   
Competitive 
county  -0.00055   -0.00148 * -0.00520  0.00070 
 (0.0041)    (0.0014)   (0.0151)   (0.0039)   
Debt-asset ratio  0.01319    -0.00217 -0.01842  -0.00381 
 (0.0134)    (0.0035)   (0.0184)   (0.0051)   
Term-debt-
coverage-ratio -0.00004    -0.00052 * -0.00026  0.00091 
 (0.0008)    (0.0004)   (0.0017)   (0.0010)   
Return on 
assets 0.00000    -0.00014 0.00005  -0.00004 
 (0.0001)    (0.0002)   (0.0001)   (0.0000)   
Farm net worth  0.00015    0.00000 ** 0.00012  -0.00020 *
 (0.0004)    (0.0000)   (0.0004)   (0.0002)   
Diversification 0.01111    0.00802 -0.03443  -0.00647 
 (0.0711)    (0.0144)   (0.0804)   (0.0396)   
Operator 
experience -0.00020  *  0.00006 0.00024  * 0.00000 
 (0.0002)    (0.0001)   (0.0002)   (0.0001)   
Refinancing -0.00947    -0.00435 ** -0.00677  0.00031 
 (0.0101)    (0.0027)   (0.0088)   (0.0162)   
Full-time 
farmer -0.00584    -0.00427 -0.01600  * -0.00150 
 (0.0061)    (0.0055)   (0.0162)   (0.0031)   
Noncommercial 
farmers 0.00555  *  0.00189 0.00442  0.00245 
 (0.0045)    (0.0048)   (0.0191)   (0.0058)   
Higher 
education -0.00147    -0.00951 ** -0.00298  -0.00091 
 (0.0060)    (0.0029)   (0.0101)   (0.0023)   
             
Sample  #  165   2,481   88   688  
Weighted # of 
farms  28,408   214,142   5,044   36,074  
*    0.05 <  P ≤  0.10/ **  0.01 < P ≤  0.05/ *** P ≤ 0.01   16
The higher rates charged on FCS loans in less competitive regions may seem somewhat 
counterintuitive. As a borrower owned cooperative, FCS would not be expected to charge 
rates higher than necessary to cover all costs including accumulating sufficient capital.  
This may be partially explained, however, by FCS’s practice of paying patronage 
dividends to stockholders.  This practice is more common among associations located in 
the southeast, and northeastern, and mid-Atlantic regions. These regions also were 
considered to have little competition with respect to farm credit. In these regions the 
patronage refund reduces the effective rate paid by the borrower.  Rates reported on the 
ARMS represent initial loan contract rates and do not include the effect of patronage 
refunds. It is likely that considering patronage refunds would result in less difference in 
between FCS rates charged new FCS borrowers by level of credit market competition.  
Nonetheless, in these regions FCS tends to be the primary market player, especially for 
full-time operators of large commercial farms.  Regardless of whether or not effective 
rates are reduced through patronage, the ability to charge such high rates initially would 
be consistent with a lack of credit market competition. 














Competitive \a  -1.696   -1.604 -4.566 1.033 
Noncompetitive \a  -0.875  3.990 32.200 5.591 
Debt asset  0.036  -0.007 0.001 -0.010 
Coverage ratio  -0.000  -0.000 0.010 0.000 
Loan size  -0.017  0.001 0.005 0.002 
Return on assets  0.000  -0.000 0.005 -0.000 
Net worth  0.007  0.013 0.026 -0.015 
Diversification -0.002  0.000 0.054 0.001 
Farm experience  -0.014  0.003 0.001 0.009 
Refinance \a  3.977  0.297 -2.800 4.007 
Full time \a  -6.232  -7.188 -19.808 -4.979 
Noncommercial \a  3.826  4.744 4.557 10.167 
College \a  -2.762  -8.356 -4.126 -7.288 
Estimated as the change in the predicted rate resulting from a 1% change 
in the independent variable. 
Significant variables from Table 4 are shown as bold. 
 \a Sensitivity for binary variables were estimated as the percent change 
in the predicted borrower rate for the binary variable =1 from the binary 
rate =0.   17
Summary 
 
The commercial banking in the US has been transformed by deregulation. Banking 
institutions have consolidated while banking offices have proliferated.  Federal credit 
programs for agriculture were implemented in a time prior to deregulation, when farmers 
and those in rural areas were considered to be underserved by commercial banks. The 
proliferation of banking offices occurring since deregulation may challenge some of the 
economic justifications for Federal farm credit programs. But, past studies have indicated 
most of the expansion in banking offices has occurred in more urban areas raising 
questions about  what impact, if any, banking deregulation has had on the farm credit 
availability.  
 
Our analysis suggests that a regional disparity in the availability of farm credit may exist. 
About one-third of all counties in the US were served by 3 or more commercial banks 
that provided farm loans and, therefore, were considered highly competitive. Another 
third of counties appeared not to be served by any commercial banks that provided farm 
loans and were likely to have little competition with respect to farm credit.  Counties 
considered competitive with respect to farm credit were located in the farming regions of 
the Corn Belt and Great Plains while counties considered to have little competitive were 
located in regions where farming is less prevalent; Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, Appalachia, 
and Southeast.  While counties with little competition counties represented large 
geographic areas, they contributed little to US farm production. Mostly, farms were of 
noncommercial size and engaged in production of beef cattle, hay, and horses.  . 
 
An analysis of rates charged by commercial banks on new real estate and nonreal estate 
loans indicated no differences in rates by level of credit market competition.  This was 
true even after controlling for differences in loan purpose, time of origination, and level 
of risk.  These results are not consistent with an expectation that farm borrowers in less 
competitive credit markets would pay higher interest rates.  One explanation may be that 
there is enough banking presence even in counties little presence of farm bank branches 
to assure an adequate level of market competition.  This may be especially true of smaller   18
noncommercial farms, which are common in regions with little competition,  whose 
credit needs are more reflective of consumer rather than farm credit. 
 
One may infer from our analysis that larger commercial size farms in counties with little 
competition may be disadvantaged by the lack of lenders providing farm credit.  Full-
time commercial farmers are more likely served by FCS rather than commercial banks.  
Rates charged by FCS on both real estate and nonreal estate loans were higher in counties 
with little competition, even after controlling for loan purpose, time of origination, loan 
size, and risk.  While the effective rate paid by FCS borrowers may actually be lower 
because of the effect of patronage refunds, the ability to charge higher up-front rates is 
telling of the level competition. 
 
Our analysis shows that despite the an increase in the number of banking offices 
occurring since banking deregulation, large numbers of counties appear not to be served 
by commercial banks that provide farms loans.  However, farms in counties considered to 
have little competition contribute little to the overall production of the Nation’s food and 
fiber.  And, there is no evidence that farm interest rates charged by commercial banks is 
any higher in regions considered to have little competition.  Higher FCS interest rates in 
less competitive counties suggest that full-time commercial-size farms may be 
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